What is Taiwan’s plan B? It is starting to hedge against the risk that America abandons it Oct 23rd 2025|Taipei|6 min read Officials in Taiwan were quietly optimistic when Donald Trump was re-elected. Among his advisers were several diehard China hawks determined that America stand by its vow to help Taiwan defend itself against any attack from the Chinese mainland. Taiwanese diplomats and military commanders also recalled Mr Trump’s first term, when he increased arms sales and official contacts with the island. Besides, Taiwan has a “silicon shield”: it is home to the world’s biggest producer of the semiconductors that are used by America’s AI industry. Less than a year later, Taiwan is confronting one of its deepest fears: what happens if America abandons it? Officially, American policy has not changed. But Mr Trump is preoccupied with negotiating a trade deal with China that could also encompass Taiwan. He hinted at that in May by suggesting that such a deal would be “great for unification and peace”. Although American officials later walked that back, Mr Trump jangled nerves in Taiwan again on October 19th by saying that he expected to discuss the island in a planned meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in South Korea at the end of October. And these are not the only shocks. Mr Trump has hit Taiwan with steeper trade tariffs than those he has imposed on Japan and South Korea; demanded that the island increase defence spending to 10% of GDP (from 2.5% last year); and asked TSMC, its chipmaking giant, to move much of its production to America. Other troubling signs include his putting off planned stopovers in America by Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, and failing to approve new arms sales to the island. Meanwhile, most of the China hawks have been purged from his administration, giving way to isolationist officials who want to secure the American homeland at all cost. And Chinese officials have been pressing long-standing demands for America to water down its commitment to Taiwan, possibly by explicitly opposing any move to declare formal independence. Taiwan’s government says its relationship with America remains strong. In recent weeks, however, Taiwanese officials have been scrambling to adjust their public messaging, private diplomacy, economic policy and defence planning in response to these developments. Their primary aim is to convince Mr Trump to sustain America’s commitment to Taiwan. But they are also starting to hedge against the risk that he makes a strategic “grand bargain” with Mr Xi at the island’s expense. The shift was evident in President Lai’s national-day address on October 10th. His remarks on mainland China were notably restrained. Since Mr Lai took office in 2024 he has made a series of public comments that have angered China and unnerved some American officials, including in last year’s national-day address. China has staged large military exercises in response, accusing Mr Lai of separatism and warning that he was “playing with fire”. This time, Mr Lai trod gingerly, apparently to avoid disrupting Mr Trump’s trade talks. Another contrast with last year’s address was Mr Lai’s pledge to boost defence spending. He vowed to increase it to more than 3% of GDP in 2026 and to 5% by 2030. He also unveiled plans to build an air-defence system called “T-Dome” over Taiwan. And he pledged to supplement regular defence spending with a “special defence budget” later this year. Although that may struggle to get through parliament, officials say it could be worth as much as $33bn and that a lot of it could be spent on American weapons. Those plans are part of an effort to convince Mr Trump that Taiwan is investing in its own defence. And the way they were presented reflects a recognition that previous lobbying in America was too geared towards China hawks whose influence is fading. Even the branding of “T-Dome” was meant to get Mr Trump’s attention by encouraging comparisons to his “Golden Dome” missile-defence system. Mr Lai also took the unusual step of appearing on a popular American right-wing radio show on October 7th. Not only did he tout his defence plans: he said Mr Trump should win a Nobel peace prize if he got Mr Xi to abandon the use of force against Taiwan. Shortly afterwards, Mr Lai met Matt Schlapp, a right-wing American political activist (Taiwan’s top military think-tank had invited him to visit Taipei). While this charm offensive plays out, Mr Lai has been quietly** boosting defence ties with partners other than America**. In his national-day address he said his government would “collaborate with the military industries of advanced nations”. Taiwanese officials are reluctant to be more specific, citing the risk that China penalises countries involved. But the focus is on drones and such “asymmetric” capabilities. And the outreach appears to have focused on Europe of late, as countries there increase their own defence spending in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. European governments and companies were somewhat better represented than usual at Taiwan’s biggest defence show in September. Germany’s trade office in Taipei took part for the first time; it set up a pavilion showcasing four German firms. Airbus turned up, too; it showed off a tactical aerial drone. In Poland that same month, a Taiwanese defence-industry delegation agreed with Polish and Ukrainian counterparts to co-operate in manufacturing aerial drones. European and other non-American partners are unlikely to provide Taiwan with big-ticket weapons, given the risk of Chinese recriminations. But there is scope for discreet co-operation between defence companies. Taiwan is an alternative supplier of high-tech electronic components for countries trying to become less reliant on China, including in the defence sector, says Lai Chun-kuei of the Taiwanese government’s Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology. In exchange, Taiwan wants technology and expertise to help build its own capabilities. Some critics say all this is too little, too late. Even if Mr Trump and his supporters approve of Taiwan’s defence spending, they have deeper differences with the island’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party on issues such as gender, green energy and the death penalty, says Alexander Huang, a former envoy in Washington for the main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT). Mr Lai’s defence-spending plans could also face resistance between now and the island’s next presidential election in 2028. Cheng Li-wun, who was chosen as the KMT’s new leader on October 18th, is opposed to boosting the defence budget. Certainly none of these plans is sufficient to compensate should American security guarantees vanish. The hope in Taiwan, though, is not that it can find a substitute for America. It is that it can bolster its own capabilities just enough to keep Mr Xi convinced that the costs of an invasion, even if successful, outweigh the benefits. Without America, that may not be achievable. But there is no other good plan B. ■ 當美國拋棄台灣時：台灣的「B計畫」是什麼？ —— 台灣開始為「美國可能不再挺台」做準備 2025年10月23日｜台北｜約6分鐘閱讀 當川普再次當選美國總統時，台灣官員其實一開始還頗為樂觀。因為他的顧問團隊裡有幾位堅定的「反中鷹派」，主張美國應履行承諾，協助台灣抵禦來自中國大陸的攻擊。許多台灣外交與軍方人士也記得川普第一任期時，他曾增加對台軍售與官方往來。此外，台灣擁有所謂的「矽盾」—— 全世界最大半導體製造商就設在台灣，而美國的人工智慧產業仰賴這些晶片。 但不到一年，台灣便面臨最深的恐懼：如果美國真的拋棄台灣，該怎麼辦？ 表面上，美國的對台政策並未改變，但川普如今正全力推動與中國的貿易協議，而台灣問題似乎也在其中。他今年5月曾暗示，這樣的協議「有助於統一與和平」。雖然美國官員事後急忙澄清，但10月19日，川普又表示他預計月底在南韓與習近平會面時，會「討論台灣問題」，再度讓台北神經緊繃。 而這並不是唯一的警訊。川普對台灣祭出的貿易關稅比日本、南韓更高；他要求台灣將國防預算從去年的GDP 2.5%一口氣提高到10%；還要求台積電把大部分生產線搬到美國。此外，他推遲了賴清德總統原訂的美國過境行程，也遲遲未批准新的對台軍售案。 更糟的是，川普政府中的多位「挺台鷹派」已被撤換，取而代之的是一群「美國優先」的孤立主義官員，強調要不惜一切保護美國本土安全。同時，中國方面也持續施壓，要求美方在對台立場上「鬆綁」，甚至希望美國明確表態反對台灣任何形式的「法理獨立」。 儘管台灣政府對外仍強調「台美關係堅若磐石」，但近來可以明顯看出，台北正加緊調整其公開發言、外交策略、經濟政策與國防布局，以因應新局。主要目的是想說服川普維持美國對台的安全承諾，同時也要為最壞的情況——川普與習近平達成「大交易」犧牲台灣——預做準備。 這樣的轉變在賴清德10月10日的國慶演說中尤為明顯。相較去年，他談論中國的語氣顯得格外克制。自2024年上任以來，賴清德曾多次發表讓北京不滿、讓部分美國官員不安的言論，去年國慶演說後更引來中國大規模軍演，指控他是「頑固的分裂分子」。但今年，他明顯收斂，顯然是為了避免干擾川普的對中談判。 與去年相比，賴清德也在演說中宣布要大幅提升國防預算。他承諾2026年將提高至GDP的3%以上，2030年達到5%。同時，他宣布啟動名為「T-Dome」的全島防空系統計畫，並將在年底提出特別國防預算，估計規模可達330億美元，主要用於購買美國武器。 這些舉措旨在向川普展示：台灣願意自我防衛、分擔責任。甚至「T-Dome」這個名稱，也刻意呼應川普任內的「黃金圓頂」（Golden Dome）飛彈防禦系統，好讓他印象深刻。 賴清德甚至在10月7日罕見地登上美國右翼廣播節目，強調台灣的防衛努力，並稱如果川普能讓習近平放棄武力犯台，「那他值得拿諾貝爾和平獎」。之後，他還會見了美國保守派政治人物馬特・施拉普（Matt Schlapp），這是由台灣國防智庫邀請他訪台。 在積極拉攏美方的同時，賴清德也悄悄強化與其他國家的防務合作。他在國慶演說中提到，台灣將「與先進國家的軍工產業合作」。台灣官員對細節三緘其口，以免引來中國報復，但外界普遍認為重點在於無人機與「非對稱作戰」能力，最近則特別著眼於歐洲。 歐洲國家因應俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭，國防支出大幅增加，也讓台歐互動升溫。九月舉行的台灣國防展上，歐洲代表團規模明顯擴大。德國經濟辦事處首度設立展區，展示四家德國企業；空中巴士（Airbus）也到場展示戰術無人機。同月，在波蘭，台灣代表團與波蘭、烏克蘭的國防業者簽署合作協議，共同生產無人機。 雖然歐洲與其他非美國夥伴不太可能提供台灣大型武器，以免激怒北京，但雙方在軍工企業層面的低調合作仍有空間。台灣本身也能為歐洲提供高科技電子零件，幫助他們降低對中國的依賴；作為交換，台灣希望獲得技術與專業，強化自己的軍工實力。 然而，也有批評者認為這一切為時已晚。前駐美代表、現任國民黨要角黃介正指出，即使川普陣營欣賞台灣提升國防支出，他們在性別議題、綠能政策與死刑等價值觀上，與民進黨仍存在深刻分歧。新任國民黨主席鄭麗文（10月18日當選）也公開反對提高國防預算。 可以肯定的是，這些措施都不足以彌補若失去美國安全保障所造成的缺口。但台灣的希望並非要找到取代美國的選項，而是要讓中國相信：即便能攻下台灣，代價也將高到不值得。 若沒有美國的支持，這目標恐怕難以實現。 但除了這條路，台灣也沒有更好的「B計畫」。 ■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn