Abstract: Why do states decide to criticize come countries, but not others, over domestic human rights abuses? States often criticize rights violations abroad to improve human rights or bolster their own legitimacy, while refraining from criticizing allies. States can also be deterred from criticism by countercriticism coercion, or economic sanctions in response to criticism. I theorize that states are more likely to be deterred from criticizing countries with a reputation for countercriticism coercion, notably China. States learn from other countries’ past responses to criticism, rather than their economic power, stated positions on human rights, or domestic policies. UN member states are less likely to criticize rights violations in countries with reputations for countercriticism coercion. Elite interviews demonstrate how China’s reputation for countercriticism coercion deterred Indonesia and Malaysia from criticizing China over human rights in Xinjiang. This study has implications for the effectiveness of sanctions and resilience of international human rights norms.