A large ferry en route from Jeju to Mokpo struck an uninhabited island near Jangsan-myeon in Shinan County, South Jeolla, on Nov. 19. Images of the Queen Jenuvia II, a 26,546-ton passenger vessel more than three times the size of the Sewol, with half its hull grounded on the rocky shore, revived painful memories of the 2014 tragedy. With 267 passengers on board, the incident risked becoming another major maritime disaster.
The Korea Coast Guard rescued everyone within about three hours. Thirty passengers were taken to hospitals, though none suffered critical injuries. President Lee Jae Myung, traveling overseas at the time, instructed authorities to respond swiftly, and the initial rescue operation proceeded relatively quickly. Even so, the lessons of this latest accident cannot be taken lightly.
Early findings by investigators point strongly to human error. According to the Coast Guard's preliminary review, the first mate responsible for navigation allegedly missed the timing for a course change because he was reading the news on his mobile phone. The ferry, traveling at around 22 knots, should have shifted direction about 1,600 meters before the island, but the officer reportedly recognized the danger only when the ship was within 100 meters of land. A helmsman was also required to switch to manual steering in the area, but did not follow procedures.
The captain was reportedly absent from the bridge, arguing that it was not his duty shift. Officials noted that the area is dense with small islands and narrow shipping lanes, making attentive navigation critical. The failure to follow basic protocols in such waters is difficult to comprehend. The requirement for captains to directly supervise navigation in hazardous zones also appears to have been ignored. Safety rules reinforced after the Sewol sinking did not seem to function in practice.
Korea vowed after the Sewol disaster that such negligence would never be repeated. Yet this case suggests that fundamental practices are still not fully embedded in day-to-day operations. Authorities must examine whether oversight by ferry operators, crew training, and monitoring by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and the Coast Guard weakened over time.
A thorough investigation into the causes and responsibilities is the minimum. More importantly, regulators must determine whether the structural vulnerabilities identified a decade ago remain unresolved and whether the safety framework built after the Sewol tragedy is functioning as intended. The promise of a safer Korea cannot remain a slogan.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.