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PROXY COUNTDOWN
Free Float Media, Inc.
63 episodes
2 weeks ago
2025 REVIEW FROM MIKE LEVIN: Big proxy contests: PHX-Elliott Significant situations: PEP-Elliott TSLA AGM SEC rules on shareholder proposals Proxy advisor pressure Delaware under scrutiny US stakes in INTL, others XOM retail voting program 2026 PREDICTIONS: DIRECTORS Will a director be voted out in an uncontested election this year for a reason OUTSIDE of attendance (re: Netflix’s Jay Hoag’s 78% NO vote) at a big US company? The average percentage of directors getting less than 50% of the vote is 0.2% - generally it happens due to activism OR attendance.  Will it happen for some other reason? Canary in a coal mine: what will Hoag’s FOR votes be in 2026?  The average percentage of women on boards will be? Most recent data shows a 22% drop in new diverse candidates on boards, and Damion pulled a stunning number of “Down to 2” as a common refrain for boards looking to diversify away from women.  The current average number of women on large cap US boards is 30% - how far does the average move after 2025-6? SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS Which company will allow the most shareholder proposals? In 2025, Alphabet clocked in with the highest number of shareholder proposals at 13, followed by Meta at 9, Amazon at 8, and Walmart and Berkshire tied at 7. Which one of these shareholder proponents will see the highest number of exclusions in  2026: Activists: (23% supports in 2025) Anti woke: (2%) AOs / Pensions: (12%) Woke: (10%) Governance: (29%) Religious: (10%) Number of shareholder proposals that will WIN in 2026 (approx 50 in 2025)? E vs S vs G (45 vs 5 vs 0) Palo Alto Networks on Tuesday: 93% YES on a James McRitchie bid to eliminate its classified board, despite the company being AGAINST. PAY How many companies will fail Say on Pay in 2026 (27, About 1.2% of Russell 3000 companies, failed Say on Pay in 2025)? Palo Alto failed Tuesday: 54% NO How many post-Musk billion dollar+ CEO pay packages will we see in 2026? Which is more likely:  Which is the SEC more likely to have to redefine to address the December 11, 2025 executive whining titled “PROTECTING AMERICAN INVESTORS FROM FOREIGN-OWNED AND POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED PROXY ADVISORS”, which asks the SEC to “consider” rescinding rule 14-8a, investigating if proxy advisors committed securities fraud (and should be registered), consider forcing methodology disclosure, “investigate” collusion with asset managers, and calling proxy advisors “fiduciaries” if they charge a fee to pension funds: Anti-fraud laws  - currently the laws deal with the “purchase or sale” of a security, not saying “this non binding shareholder proposal about donut hole size is a vote YES based on the criteria you provided”... they would have to redefine scienter to include advice for sale, not securities?  Or they would have to decide that they had a coordinated scheme to defraud THE ENTIRE MARKET? Investment advice fiduciaries - ERISA sets duty of loyalty, care, and prudence, and it applies to anyone exercising discretion over a pension for a fee - they would have to consider the purchase of ANY data, rating, opinion, or even made-to-order service (like back end data dashboards) a form of advice, and thus make them all fiduciaries.  Unless they just change the rule and say “proxy advisors are fiduciaries” because kabuki theater? ESG - they’ve included in here considering rescission of rules that “advance” ESG policies - but there’s a G in ESG.  That would include literally the act of voting, the election of directors, special meetings, bylaws amendments - EVERYTHING that happens.  In which case, do they need to redefine ESG to just mean “woke stuff we don’t like” (which could, in fact, mean G also)?  And is every activist investor then woke? The SEC No-Action gaslight - where they no longer will oppose shareholder proposal exclusions - is more likely to: Result in more votes against directors - between the 13g vs. 13d guidance and the “we’re just too busy to read shareholder proposals for an entire year” guidance, and ISS [i think it’s actually glass lewis that’s moving away from recommendations entirely] suggesting they won’t actually provide a recommendation anymore, there’s not much else for investors to do, right? Fuel a rise in shareholder proposals - and disclosure from proponents about exclusions to “name and shame” companies who are using the feckless SEC as cloud cover to avoid governance or shareholder demands.  Fuel a rise in activism - in the absence of being able to ask a company to make an amendment to a bylaw or declassify a board on the proxy, doesn’t it just make activism more hostile? If a company is underperforming, investors don’t have the SEC behind them as much any more?  Coupled with Texas rules that make it harder to file proposals at all, and the move toward mandatory arbitration vs. regulatory/legal oversight, it’s all activism now, right? Push more companies to Texas - the SEC is basically Texas-ifying guidance, but Delaware isn’t biting yet.  Inevitably, do more companies move to Texas to take advantage of having fewer shareholder rights? Musk’s mega pay package is more likely to: Open the floodgates to mini-Musk packages - instead of 10 years and 12 tranches, expect pay committees to start putting forward 4 years and 6 tranche billion dollar packages for companies that make hydraulic presses and deli meat. Push investors to vote against pay EVERYWHERE, since they already feel bad giving Musk so much (like after you eat too much chocolate, you just never want it again) End say on pay - what’s the point really?  Some fringe investors vote against pay, and it’s non binding?  If you are excluding shareholder proposals anyway, why not end say on pay and force investors to just vote against pay committee members? DO NOTHING.  No one actually cares how much an executive gets paid, all the CEO pay ratio data and disclosures are kabuki theater anyway. DExit winner is most likely: Nevada Texas Delaware No one
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2025 REVIEW FROM MIKE LEVIN: Big proxy contests: PHX-Elliott Significant situations: PEP-Elliott TSLA AGM SEC rules on shareholder proposals Proxy advisor pressure Delaware under scrutiny US stakes in INTL, others XOM retail voting program 2026 PREDICTIONS: DIRECTORS Will a director be voted out in an uncontested election this year for a reason OUTSIDE of attendance (re: Netflix’s Jay Hoag’s 78% NO vote) at a big US company? The average percentage of directors getting less than 50% of the vote is 0.2% - generally it happens due to activism OR attendance.  Will it happen for some other reason? Canary in a coal mine: what will Hoag’s FOR votes be in 2026?  The average percentage of women on boards will be? Most recent data shows a 22% drop in new diverse candidates on boards, and Damion pulled a stunning number of “Down to 2” as a common refrain for boards looking to diversify away from women.  The current average number of women on large cap US boards is 30% - how far does the average move after 2025-6? SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS Which company will allow the most shareholder proposals? In 2025, Alphabet clocked in with the highest number of shareholder proposals at 13, followed by Meta at 9, Amazon at 8, and Walmart and Berkshire tied at 7. Which one of these shareholder proponents will see the highest number of exclusions in  2026: Activists: (23% supports in 2025) Anti woke: (2%) AOs / Pensions: (12%) Woke: (10%) Governance: (29%) Religious: (10%) Number of shareholder proposals that will WIN in 2026 (approx 50 in 2025)? E vs S vs G (45 vs 5 vs 0) Palo Alto Networks on Tuesday: 93% YES on a James McRitchie bid to eliminate its classified board, despite the company being AGAINST. PAY How many companies will fail Say on Pay in 2026 (27, About 1.2% of Russell 3000 companies, failed Say on Pay in 2025)? Palo Alto failed Tuesday: 54% NO How many post-Musk billion dollar+ CEO pay packages will we see in 2026? Which is more likely:  Which is the SEC more likely to have to redefine to address the December 11, 2025 executive whining titled “PROTECTING AMERICAN INVESTORS FROM FOREIGN-OWNED AND POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED PROXY ADVISORS”, which asks the SEC to “consider” rescinding rule 14-8a, investigating if proxy advisors committed securities fraud (and should be registered), consider forcing methodology disclosure, “investigate” collusion with asset managers, and calling proxy advisors “fiduciaries” if they charge a fee to pension funds: Anti-fraud laws  - currently the laws deal with the “purchase or sale” of a security, not saying “this non binding shareholder proposal about donut hole size is a vote YES based on the criteria you provided”... they would have to redefine scienter to include advice for sale, not securities?  Or they would have to decide that they had a coordinated scheme to defraud THE ENTIRE MARKET? Investment advice fiduciaries - ERISA sets duty of loyalty, care, and prudence, and it applies to anyone exercising discretion over a pension for a fee - they would have to consider the purchase of ANY data, rating, opinion, or even made-to-order service (like back end data dashboards) a form of advice, and thus make them all fiduciaries.  Unless they just change the rule and say “proxy advisors are fiduciaries” because kabuki theater? ESG - they’ve included in here considering rescission of rules that “advance” ESG policies - but there’s a G in ESG.  That would include literally the act of voting, the election of directors, special meetings, bylaws amendments - EVERYTHING that happens.  In which case, do they need to redefine ESG to just mean “woke stuff we don’t like” (which could, in fact, mean G also)?  And is every activist investor then woke? The SEC No-Action gaslight - where they no longer will oppose shareholder proposal exclusions - is more likely to: Result in more votes against directors - between the 13g vs. 13d guidance and the “we’re just too busy to read shareholder proposals for an entire year” guidance, and ISS [i think it’s actually glass lewis that’s moving away from recommendations entirely] suggesting they won’t actually provide a recommendation anymore, there’s not much else for investors to do, right? Fuel a rise in shareholder proposals - and disclosure from proponents about exclusions to “name and shame” companies who are using the feckless SEC as cloud cover to avoid governance or shareholder demands.  Fuel a rise in activism - in the absence of being able to ask a company to make an amendment to a bylaw or declassify a board on the proxy, doesn’t it just make activism more hostile? If a company is underperforming, investors don’t have the SEC behind them as much any more?  Coupled with Texas rules that make it harder to file proposals at all, and the move toward mandatory arbitration vs. regulatory/legal oversight, it’s all activism now, right? Push more companies to Texas - the SEC is basically Texas-ifying guidance, but Delaware isn’t biting yet.  Inevitably, do more companies move to Texas to take advantage of having fewer shareholder rights? Musk’s mega pay package is more likely to: Open the floodgates to mini-Musk packages - instead of 10 years and 12 tranches, expect pay committees to start putting forward 4 years and 6 tranche billion dollar packages for companies that make hydraulic presses and deli meat. Push investors to vote against pay EVERYWHERE, since they already feel bad giving Musk so much (like after you eat too much chocolate, you just never want it again) End say on pay - what’s the point really?  Some fringe investors vote against pay, and it’s non binding?  If you are excluding shareholder proposals anyway, why not end say on pay and force investors to just vote against pay committee members? DO NOTHING.  No one actually cares how much an executive gets paid, all the CEO pay ratio data and disclosures are kabuki theater anyway. DExit winner is most likely: Nevada Texas Delaware No one
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WSJ’s Top 250 directors, plus Exxon’s vote, Elliott’s win, and Tesla’s new director
PROXY COUNTDOWN
50 minutes 9 seconds
7 months ago
WSJ’s Top 250 directors, plus Exxon’s vote, Elliott’s win, and Tesla’s new director
Trade Wire - BUY/SELL Top Stories: Chipotle Chief Strategy Officer and former CFO Jack Hartung is joining the board of Tesla, where he will be greeted by his son-in-law–a non-executive, salaried employee of Tesla since 2016–and Elon’s brother Kimbal, who served on Chipotle board from 2013 to 2019. Here’s a good one at small cap company Luminar Technologies, following a Code of Business Conduct and Ethics inquiry by the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors, CEO and Chair Austin Russell and director Jun Hong Heng immediately resigned. However, the former CEO will remain on the Board and be available to the incoming CEO on transition and technology matters. As a companion piece to the 2025 “down to two women on the board but nobody seems to care” theory, there are several companies now that are appointing male directors despite having only two women on the board, as an example: Nutanix is comfortable with only two women as they replace retiring David Humphrey with Eric Brandt. With Eric, they now have two board members who were executives at Broadcom, a second director who also has experience being CFO, and a guy that already serves on four other publicly-traded companies so he understands how to schedule board meetings. Likewise at Qorvo, Peter Feld joins a board with only two women. Peter represents the second director at Qorvo with experience at Marvell Technology And at Live Nation Entertainment Trump administration toady Richard Grenell joins a 2-women Board; just this morning the new Live nation Entertainment director tweeted: “Left wing violence is out of control from Palm Springs, CA to Washington, DC. Leaders on the Left must speak up now. We all must focus on this growing Left wing violence problem.” Grenell is miraculously the acting president of the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts despite no background in anything resembling “the Arts.” Two influential directors are stepping down from their respective boards: O’Reilly Automotive is losing Larry O’Reilly, consistent with the Board’s mandatory retirement age policy. Luckily for shareholders they have a spare O’Reilly in the trunk: that’s Larry’s brother David O’Reilly. And at Paychex, founder, former CEO/Chair, and board member since the Carter Administration Thomas Golisano and his 63% influence is stepping down. That’s a lot of power up for grabs. Finally, in executive pay news: Bath & Body Works has a new CEO, Daniel Heaf, who will replace Gina Boswell. The total bill to shareholders is more than $17M: a golden hello of $5M and a golden parachute of $12M And at Omnicom Group, Chair and CEO John Wren is giving up his $1M annual salary in order to get a massive pile of 4M options without performance-based conditions. This means that if the company can get back to its share price from only 6 months ago the CEO will have managed to make $120M. PROXY CAGE MATCH Phillips 66 and activist investor Elliott Investment Management each won two seats at the company’s annual meeting this week, capping one of the biggest proxy cage matches of the year and following months of increasingly bitter finger-pointing between the two sides. The vote is significant because no activist at an S&P 500 company had successfully won a board seat in at least 15 years without support of one of the big three index funds—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, While Elliott’s campaign was backed by prominent proxy advisory firms ISS, Glass Lewis, and Egan-Jones, Phillips 66’s top three passive investors all sided with the company. The two Elliott nominees elected were Sigmund “Sig” Cornelius, who recently retired as the president of Freeport LNG, and Michael Heim, an operating partner with Stonepeak who also was a founder and president of the Targa Resources midstream pipeline giant. On the Phillips 66 candidate slate, Robert Pease was reelected, and Harbour Energy COO Nigel Hearne was added to the board. Victoria's Secret adopted a "poison pill" plan to block a potential takeover by Brett Blundy’s firm, BBRC International, unless all shareholders are fairly compensated. Starting May 29, shareholders will get rights that activate if anyone acquires 15% or more of the company, allowing them to buy shares at a discount and dilute BBRC’s stake, which is currently about 13%. After resolving past antitrust filing violations, BBRC is now allowed to increase its stake to 49.99%. VOTE RESULTS TABLE Here are the highlights from 100 large-cap annual meetings over the past week: Only 41 total SHPs: and from only 34 companies, meaning 66 meetings had zero SHPs. In fact, 51 of 100 meetings had nothing happening: zero shareholder proposals and zero shareholder dissent. Only 6 wins overall: Say on Pay Otis Worldwide: 61% NO Simon Property Group: 53% NO Simple Majority vote Choice Hotels International: 97% YES Alexandria Real Estate Equities: 84% YES Celanese: 64% YES Skyworks Solutions: 98% YES 13 “moral” victories (over 30%): Say on Pay O-I Glass: 34% NO Las Vegas Sands: 38% NO Akamai Technologies: Stock Incentive Plan 41% NO AIG: 35% NO BlackRock: 33% NO CVS Health: 41% NO Shareholder approval on excessive golden parachutes Vertex Pharmaceuticals: 37% YES Simple Majority vote Medspace Holdings: 31% NO Shareholders ability to call a special meeting Xylem: 46% YES Act by written consent CVS Health: 43% YES Independent board chair Colgate-Palmolive: 30% YES Cummins: 41% YES political contributions Otis Worldwide: 40% YES The shareholder disconnects: Otis Worldwide: 61% NO on Pay; lowest director 93% YES/98% average YES Alexandria Real Estate Equities: 27% NO on Pay; lowest director 91% YES Las Vegas Sands: 38% NO on Pay; 6 of 9 directors between 10% and 18% NO BlackRock: 33% NO on Pay; lowest 2 directors 92% and 96% Motorola Solutions: 20% NO on Pay; lowest director 92% YES CVS Health: 41% NO on Pay; lowest director 91% YES (97% average YES) The directors (over 20%): only 17 higher than 20%, 2 over 30%, and 1 over 40% (about 900 directors: 2% over 20%) WEX: James (Jim) Neary 31% NO; Melissa Smith 33% NO; Jack VanWoerkom 41% NO Enphase Energy: Thurman John Rodgers 61% NO (classified board) Haverty Furniture: 42% NO G. Thomas Hough Universal Health Services: Maria Singer (49% NO; Class B & D) Teleflex: All directors between 28% and 36% NO; (Say on Pay 27% NO) Simon Property Group: Glyn F. Aeppel (37% NO); Larry C. Glasscock (30% NO); Gary M. Rodkin (27% NO); Peggy Fang Roe (27% NO); (Say on Pay 53% NO) AIG: Diana M. Murphy 21% NO; Linda Mills 26% NO; James (Jimmy) Dunne III (~20% NO); (35% NO on Pay) Molson Coors Beverage: Roger G. Eaton 21% NO First Solar: Paul H. Stebbins 21% NO APi Group: Carrie A. Wheeler 28% NO Teradata: Michael P. Gianoni 26% NO The oddities: Auditor dissent?! Elevance Health: 12% NO American Water Works: 12% NO First Solar: 13% NO Align Technology: 10% NO The bullshit: The Domino’s Pizza competing proposals dirty trick: where the board proposes a version of the shareholder's proposal that is slightly more onerous: in this case, 25% vs. 15% of shareholders having the the ability to call a special meeting: Align Technology: Management (65% YES) versus SHP John Chevveden (17% YES) Akamai Technologies: 10% call a special meeting (51% YES/58,453,104) vs. 25% call a special meeting (52% YES/59,520,777) THE BIG VOTE PICKS MATT The Wall Street Journal released a report on the Top 250 Board Directors The 250 most influential and effective corporate directors who are set to serve on an S&P 500 board throughout 2025. There is no definition of what is either influential OR effective There is a methodology that focuses on a point system for individual attributes (like committees and roles), company performance, and a bonus for sitting on a lot of big boards The methodology includes what seems like a random point system - the maximum number of points a director could hypothetically get is 23.25… because… it’s a number… But the important things to note is there are no real consequences in the list to underperforming, they value being a lead “independent” director or chair, they don’t care if the company is being sued, and they really like directors who are professional directors on lots of boards So I compared the top 100 in their list to our data, this is what it looks like - and this is why we need to use analytics on directors At a minimum, we should agree what a winning director is - can we agree that a winning director should pay the CEOs the least possible for the fewest controversies and highest sustainable returns? Isn’t that the goal? Here’s the top 100: Some standouts: #1 is Ed Philip of United Airlines - weird number 1? I mean, 2 boards in our database, one totalitarian Canadian company and UAL where he has 8 years of tenure? Chair at the totalitarian company, nom chair at both… it’s such a nothingburger pick I have no idea what to say about it? Bats .600 overall, below average TSR but average everything else? It’s the most average choice ever In fact, if I filter US large cap directors by those with: >.500 TSR, earnings >2 boards No totalitarian boards I end up with a whopping 144 directors before I get to the first from the top 100, Kevin Kennedy, who ranks #7 The point system is a liability for investors - John Koraleski (#26) got ALL of his points just from sitting on committees, and only debits for performance In fact, 29 of the top 100 UNDERPERFORMED for company performance! For Monica Lozano, despite getting the performance of Apple, 59% of her 28th place score was simply sitting on a lot of boards despite underperforming on the “company” component Our data on the top 100: Dictator friendly 27 of the top 100 sit on boards that are Totalitarian - including TOP DIRECTOR Ed Philip on the BRP board in Canada For 6 of them, it’s their ONLY current board - immediate grounds for disqualification? Highly influential, but not the highest Average max influence is a whopping 13% with a min average of 8% Single most influential board member of the top 100 is Tom Salice on Mettler-Toledo, ranked 64th Long tenured 21 of them are more than 11 years, the “sweet spot” according to the methodology - and not independent in the UK Not much emphasis on smarts, resume, or diversity 15% have advanced degrees Only 11% went to elite schools 35% have been CEOs somewhere The list is 74% white and 50% white men - while large cap US companies are only 40% white men Highly networked bunch of “leaders” 51% have core industry knowledge at a board where they sit 82% have leadership experience (CEO, chair, LID) 72% are highly networked to their boards 2% have a direct economic stake in a company where they sit Only 17% of the top 100 outperform on both earnings and TSR Only 44% have paper “merit” - so more than half of the top 100 arguably don’t merit at least one board slot they have on paper Mostly manufacturing and finance As a group - 54% have a background in manufacturing or machinery, 39% have finance backgrounds A whopping 2 have a background in engineering and technology - the top directors don’t actually have any knowledge of the oncoming onslaught of an AI future? Super connected Feature in 3,828 loops back to their own boards - that’s nearly 40 loops per person There are a stellar 558 connections between these board members and their boards through the Partnership for New York City, and 513 through the Business Roundtable Without core outcomes… high TSR, low controversies Average of the top 100: 0.509 TSR, 0.427 controversies But you can vote on some of them THIS WEEK: Chevron - 4 directors in the top 100 Debra Reed-Klages Marillyn Hewson Wanda Austin Wick Moorman Exxon Joe Hooley Lowe’s Marvin Ellison Merck - 2 directors in the top 100 Tom Glocer Pamela Craig Allstate - a whopping SIX directors from the top 100 Donald Brown Andrea Redmond Monica Turner Kermit Crawford Maria Morris Perry Traquina Top 100 targets: Of them, Donald Brown, Andrea Redmond, and Kermit Crawford failed to deliver more than .400 in TSR Debra Reed-Klages is the most connected to her board at Chevron - 42% of the board she loops back to Wanda Austin has the most powerful network, also at Chevron Joe Hooley at Exxon is the only one to have sued his own investors (despite having been one at State Street)... speaking of Exxon But let’s talk about Exxon quickly… No SHPs mean you have to vote on directors instead Jeff Ubben - underperforms on TSR, earnings, and carbon He got the role on the board as an activist - and despite many board slots, he’s batting .371 on carbon, .250 on TSR, and .301 on earnings, the worst overall on the board Ubben was called an “ESG proponent” when news broke he was joining the board, which was done in part to dilute influence from Engine No 1 directors Ubben has no clear track record of being an ESG proponent in the data - maybe he talks about it? - but 4 years later, Exxon is on the REVERSE course - suing shareholders, rolling back targets He’s arguably a carbon vote Larry Kellner - underperforms… everywhere Kellner of Boeing fame is also the worst performing director up for a vote this week for credit rating drops - 26 times across all boards he’s been on in the last 7 years, Kellner’s companies saw their credit rating at SP drop Joe Hooley Get the f out with suing shareholders as an ex shareholder
PROXY COUNTDOWN
2025 REVIEW FROM MIKE LEVIN: Big proxy contests: PHX-Elliott Significant situations: PEP-Elliott TSLA AGM SEC rules on shareholder proposals Proxy advisor pressure Delaware under scrutiny US stakes in INTL, others XOM retail voting program 2026 PREDICTIONS: DIRECTORS Will a director be voted out in an uncontested election this year for a reason OUTSIDE of attendance (re: Netflix’s Jay Hoag’s 78% NO vote) at a big US company? The average percentage of directors getting less than 50% of the vote is 0.2% - generally it happens due to activism OR attendance.  Will it happen for some other reason? Canary in a coal mine: what will Hoag’s FOR votes be in 2026?  The average percentage of women on boards will be? Most recent data shows a 22% drop in new diverse candidates on boards, and Damion pulled a stunning number of “Down to 2” as a common refrain for boards looking to diversify away from women.  The current average number of women on large cap US boards is 30% - how far does the average move after 2025-6? SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS Which company will allow the most shareholder proposals? In 2025, Alphabet clocked in with the highest number of shareholder proposals at 13, followed by Meta at 9, Amazon at 8, and Walmart and Berkshire tied at 7. Which one of these shareholder proponents will see the highest number of exclusions in  2026: Activists: (23% supports in 2025) Anti woke: (2%) AOs / Pensions: (12%) Woke: (10%) Governance: (29%) Religious: (10%) Number of shareholder proposals that will WIN in 2026 (approx 50 in 2025)? E vs S vs G (45 vs 5 vs 0) Palo Alto Networks on Tuesday: 93% YES on a James McRitchie bid to eliminate its classified board, despite the company being AGAINST. PAY How many companies will fail Say on Pay in 2026 (27, About 1.2% of Russell 3000 companies, failed Say on Pay in 2025)? Palo Alto failed Tuesday: 54% NO How many post-Musk billion dollar+ CEO pay packages will we see in 2026? Which is more likely:  Which is the SEC more likely to have to redefine to address the December 11, 2025 executive whining titled “PROTECTING AMERICAN INVESTORS FROM FOREIGN-OWNED AND POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED PROXY ADVISORS”, which asks the SEC to “consider” rescinding rule 14-8a, investigating if proxy advisors committed securities fraud (and should be registered), consider forcing methodology disclosure, “investigate” collusion with asset managers, and calling proxy advisors “fiduciaries” if they charge a fee to pension funds: Anti-fraud laws  - currently the laws deal with the “purchase or sale” of a security, not saying “this non binding shareholder proposal about donut hole size is a vote YES based on the criteria you provided”... they would have to redefine scienter to include advice for sale, not securities?  Or they would have to decide that they had a coordinated scheme to defraud THE ENTIRE MARKET? Investment advice fiduciaries - ERISA sets duty of loyalty, care, and prudence, and it applies to anyone exercising discretion over a pension for a fee - they would have to consider the purchase of ANY data, rating, opinion, or even made-to-order service (like back end data dashboards) a form of advice, and thus make them all fiduciaries.  Unless they just change the rule and say “proxy advisors are fiduciaries” because kabuki theater? ESG - they’ve included in here considering rescission of rules that “advance” ESG policies - but there’s a G in ESG.  That would include literally the act of voting, the election of directors, special meetings, bylaws amendments - EVERYTHING that happens.  In which case, do they need to redefine ESG to just mean “woke stuff we don’t like” (which could, in fact, mean G also)?  And is every activist investor then woke? The SEC No-Action gaslight - where they no longer will oppose shareholder proposal exclusions - is more likely to: Result in more votes against directors - between the 13g vs. 13d guidance and the “we’re just too busy to read shareholder proposals for an entire year” guidance, and ISS [i think it’s actually glass lewis that’s moving away from recommendations entirely] suggesting they won’t actually provide a recommendation anymore, there’s not much else for investors to do, right? Fuel a rise in shareholder proposals - and disclosure from proponents about exclusions to “name and shame” companies who are using the feckless SEC as cloud cover to avoid governance or shareholder demands.  Fuel a rise in activism - in the absence of being able to ask a company to make an amendment to a bylaw or declassify a board on the proxy, doesn’t it just make activism more hostile? If a company is underperforming, investors don’t have the SEC behind them as much any more?  Coupled with Texas rules that make it harder to file proposals at all, and the move toward mandatory arbitration vs. regulatory/legal oversight, it’s all activism now, right? Push more companies to Texas - the SEC is basically Texas-ifying guidance, but Delaware isn’t biting yet.  Inevitably, do more companies move to Texas to take advantage of having fewer shareholder rights? Musk’s mega pay package is more likely to: Open the floodgates to mini-Musk packages - instead of 10 years and 12 tranches, expect pay committees to start putting forward 4 years and 6 tranche billion dollar packages for companies that make hydraulic presses and deli meat. Push investors to vote against pay EVERYWHERE, since they already feel bad giving Musk so much (like after you eat too much chocolate, you just never want it again) End say on pay - what’s the point really?  Some fringe investors vote against pay, and it’s non binding?  If you are excluding shareholder proposals anyway, why not end say on pay and force investors to just vote against pay committee members? DO NOTHING.  No one actually cares how much an executive gets paid, all the CEO pay ratio data and disclosures are kabuki theater anyway. DExit winner is most likely: Nevada Texas Delaware No one