Last time we spoke about the beginning of 1942. The Red Army pushed against Army Group Center, with Zhukov pressing to push the front back toward pre-Typhoon positions and threatening encirclements around Kaluga, Volokolamsk, and Kalinin. Soviet offensives, however, were hampered by chaotic officer training, rapid but ill-coordinated replacements, and severe winter shortages in equipment, fuel, and winter clothing, which undermined combat efficiency and morale. On the German side, there were intense internecine frictions at the highest levels: Hitler’s halt orders, Guderian’s resistance, and Kluge’s cautious attempts to withdraw where necessary. Autonomy at lower echelons, embodied in Auftragstaktik, allowed some flexible withdrawals behind the front to avoid total collapse, but high-level indecision and miscommunications contributed to disjointed German defense and intermittent retreats.  This episode is Hitler steals the Army’ Trains Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As 1941 draws to a close, the Soviet Tikhvin counteroffensive has finally ground to a halt, exhausted from the relentless fighting. Meanwhile, STAVKA shifts its focus to attempts to encircle and destroy Army Group Centre, pressing for decisive gains even as the front line buckles under pressure. They’re hammered by crises from every side as the German defenses hold, while the officer corps sometimes resembles an amateur drama troupe under the stress. The only major German offensive on the horizon faces an additional threat from new Soviet amphibious operations around Crimea.  Since the start of the invasion, Germany has suffered 621,308 wounded, 173,722 dead, 35,873 missing and this represents  25.96% of the Eastern Army which is about 3.2 million. Soviet casualty figures are notoriously hard to pin down and remain highly contested. In Colossus Reborn, historian David Glantz puts total Soviet casualties for 1941 at 566,852 combat deaths, 235,339 noncombat dead, 2,335,482 MIA and POW. 1,256,421 wounded in action. 66,169 sick. And lastly 13,557 cases of frostbite. Other historians argue the total could be significantly higher, by several million. Civilian losses in 1941 for the USSR are unknown, but estimates suggest they were extremely heavy. Despite these staggering losses, both Stalin and Hitler remained convinced that victory would come in 1942. STAVKA’s optimism and its tolerance for high Soviet casualties were bolstered, in part, by Soviet reports that absurdly claimed 300,000 German soldiers had been killed between 06 December 1941 and 15 January 1942. The December offensives pushed the German line back across the USSR, but they failed to capitalize on any single breakthrough. Now, the Germans have reformed their front, and the push must begin again. Instead of concentrating at one focal point, the burden of the next Soviet offensives is spread across the entire Ostheer, extending the strain and the risk for the German defense. General Nikolai Khlebnikov in his memoir. “Theoretically, in principle, everyone agreed that what would provide for the success of the offensive was decisive superiority over the enemy on the decisive sector of the front. However, in practice … this axiom of military the