Last time we spoke about Hitler stealing his Armies trains. The year trudged in with a cruel frost as the Eastern Front lurched into a new phase. Zhukov’s Soviet offensives pressed the German lines around Kaluga, Volokolamsk, and Kalinin, not with elegant strategy but with tenacious, grinding persistence. Across the German rear, Hitler’s halting edicts and internecine debates with generals sowed hesitancy, while Kluge’s cautious withdrawals offered few clear strategic answers. Yet within the chaos, a stubborn, almost improvised discipline, Auftragstaktik at the lower levels, kept pockets of cohesion, even as higher echelons floundered. Trains became lifelines and, at times, liabilities: routes clogged by civilian control, fuel dwindling, and spare parts vanishing. The front oscillated between sieges, counterattacks, and painstaking withdrawals along the central and northern sectors, as both sides endured frostbite and morale drains.  This episode is Stalin’s General offensive: Reinforcing Failure Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Stalin on January 5th, 1942 “The Germans are in disarray as a result of their defeat at Moscow, they are badly fitted out for the winter. This is the most favourable moment for the transition to a general offensive” Stavka planned once again to encircle and destroy Army Group Center with attacks launched from the North-Western, Kalinin, Western, and Bryansk Fronts. Simultaneously, the Leningrad, North-Western, and Volkhov Fronts, supported by the Baltic Fleet, were tasked with encircling and destroying Army Group North. In Ukraine, the Southwestern and Southern Fronts were directed to liberate Donbas, while the Caucasus Front would reconquer Crimea. Zhukov and Voznesenskii raised objections, arguing that the Red Army should concentrate its resources to smash Army Group Center rather than spreading strength and resources across the entire USSR. Zhukov “On the Western axis, where there is the most favourable set of conditions and [where] the enemy has not yet succeeded in re-establishing the combat efficiency of his units, we must continue offensive operations, but for successful offensive operations it is essential to reinforce our forces with men, equipment and to build up reserves, above all tank units, without which we can have no basis for anticipating particular success. As for offensive operations by our forces at Leningrad and on the South-Western axis, then it must be pointed out that our troops face formidable enemy defences. Without powerful artillery for support they will not be able to break through the enemy positions, they will be ground down and will suffer heavy, not to say unjustifiable losses. I am all for reinforcing the Western Front and mounting the most powerful offensive operations there.”  However, these objections were quickly dismissed by Stalin. In fact, Stavka had already issued directives for this offensive before that meeting began. Stalin’s detachment from frontline realities meant that the partial victories at Rostov, Tikhvin, and Moscow had led him to believe that Ostheer was on the brink of collapse. He planned to drain German manpower reserves during the winter and to raise new Soviet forces in the inte