Docket Number: 24-820
Date Argued: 11/12/25

24-820 RUTHERFORD V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 360

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1904

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The compassionate-release statute permits courts to reduce a prisoner's sentence if the court finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress placed only two limits on what can count as an "extraordinary and compelling reason": (1) it must be "consistent with" "applicable policy statements" from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, id .; and (2) "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extra- ordinary and compelling reason," 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).

Sections 401 and 403 of the First Step Act of 2018 reduced penalties for certain drug and firearm offenses going forward. Because of these changes, individuals sentenced today for these offenses often face mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment decades shorter than they would have received before the First Step Act.

The question presented is:

Whether, as four circuits permit but six others prohibit, a district court may consider disparities created by the First Step Act's prospective changes in sentencing law when deciding if "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-860

CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025

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24-860 CARTER V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 5339852

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1115

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Congress empowered district courts to reduce sentences of federal prisoners for "extraordinary and compelling reasons." Congress did not define the terms "extraordinary and compelling" but instead expressly delegated to the United States Sentencing Commission the authority to describe what types of circumstances qualify. Exercising that authority, the Sentencing Commission adopted a provision, Section 1B1.13(b)(6), that permits district courts to consider a sentence reduction where, among other things, the defendant has served at least ten years of an unusually long sentence and a nonretroactive change in law produces a "gross disparity" between that sentence and the one likely to be imposed at the time of the motion. The Courts of Appeals are divided on the question presented here:

Whether the Sentencing Commission acted within its expressly delegated authority by permitting district courts to consider, in narrowly cabined circumstances, a nonretroactive change in law in determining whether "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a sentence reduction.

CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-820.

CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-820_f2ah.pdf

Docket Number: 24-556
Date Argued: 11/12/25

24-556 FERNANDEZ V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 420

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-3122

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court has broad discretion to reduce the term of imprisonment in any case if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." The sole limitation Congress placed on that discretion is found in 18 U.S.C. § 994(t), which provides that "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." In reversing the district court's grant of compassionate release to Joe Fernandez, the Second Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have considered evidence bearing on Fernandez's potential innocence as well to have found a disparity in sentences between Fernandez and several of his co-defendants who were cooperating witnesses. That decision was contrary to decisions of the First and Ninth Circuits, which have each held that district courts are not restricted with respect to matters they may consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) other than as set forth by Congress. The question presented is:

Whether the Second Circuit erred in recognizing extra-textual limitations on what information a court may consider when determining whether there exist extraordinary and compeling reasons warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A COMBINATION OF “EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING REASONS” THAT MAY WARRANT A DISCRETIONARY SENTENCE REDUCTION UNDER 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A) CAN INCLUDE REASONS THAT MAY ALSO BE ALLEGED AS GROUNDS FOR VACATUR OF A SENTENCE UNDER 28 U. S. C. §2255.

CERT. GRANTED 5/27/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-556_1bn2.pdf

Docket Number: 24-758
Date Argued: 11/10/25

24-758 THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. MENOCAL

DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4544184

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1409

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals "have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts." This Court has held that certain orders are immediately appealable under Section 1291 even though they do not terminate the litigation. Such "collateral orders" include orders denying claims of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and state sovereign immunity.

The question presented, which has divided the circuit courts 5-3, is whether an order denying a government contractor's claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-758_3f14.pdf

Docket Number: 23-1197
Date Argued: 11/10/25

23-1197 LANDOR V. LA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS

DECISION BELOW: 82 F.4th 337

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-30686

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Congress has enacted two "sister" statutes to protect religious exercise: the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq ., and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq . In Tanzin v. Tanvir , 592 U.S. 43 (2020), this Court held that an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RFRA. RLUIPA's relevant language is identical.

The question presented is whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.

CERT. GRANTED 6/23/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/23-1197_3d9g.pdf

Docket Number: 24-1287
Date Argued: 11/05/25

24-1287 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. V. TRUMP

DECISION BELOW:

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-5202

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. ("IEEPA") permits the President, upon a valid emergency declaration, to "investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest[.]" Id. § l 702(a)(1)(B). Until now, no President in IEEPA's nearly 50-year history has ever invoked it to impose tariffs-let alone the sweeping worldwide tariffs imposed pursuant to the executive orders challenged here.

The question presented is:

Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs.

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. CONSOLIDATED WITH 25-250 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. THE CASES WILL BE SET FOR ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE NOVEMBER 2025 ARGUMENT SESSION.

CERT. GRANTED 9/9/2025

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25-250 TRUMP V. V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC.

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 2490634

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2025-1812, 2025-1813

QUESTION PRESENTED:

1. Whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626, authorizes the tariffs imposed by President Trump pursuant to the national emergencies declared or continued in Proclamation 10,886 and Executive Orders 14,157, 14,193, 14,194, 14,195, and 14,257, as amended.

2. If IEEPA authorizes the tariffs, whether the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the President.

THE MOTION TO EXPEDITE AND THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED. CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-1287 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. THE CASES WILL BE SET FOR ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE NOVEMBER 2025 ARGUMENT SESSION.

CERT. GRANTED 9/9/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-1287_097c.pdf

Docket Number: 24-724
Date Argued: 11/04/25

24-724 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP V. PALMQUIST

DECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 294

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-40197

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Respondents, citizens of Texas, filed this products-liability suit in state court against Petitioners Hain Celestial Group, Inc., then a citizen of Delaware and New York, and Whole Foods, Inc., a citizen of Texas. Hain removed based on diversity jurisdiction, arguing that Whole Foods should be dismissed as fraudulently joined. The district court agreed, dismissing Whole Foods with prejudice. After two additional years of federal-court litigation and a two-week jury trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Hain. On appeal, without ruling on the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing Whole Foods, vacated the final judgment, and ordered the matter remanded to state court to start from scratch. Relying on Respondents' post-removal amended complaint, the panel held, in conflict with several other courts of appeals, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment as to the completely diverse parties before it.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.

2. Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim

CERT. GRANTED 4/28/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-724_ebgj.pdf

Docket Number: 24-808
Date Argued: 11/04/25

24-808 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS, INC. V. BURTON

DECISION BELOW: 109 F.4th 438

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5881

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Well-settled legal principles dictate that a judgment entered in the absence of personal jurisdiction is void. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) authorizes federal courts to vacate a judgment when it is void. A motion seeking vacatur, however, "must be made within a reasonable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

Each of the United States Courts of Appeals other than the Sixth Circuit holds that there is effectively no time limit for moving to vacate a judgment, notwithstanding Rule 60(c)(1)'s "reasonable time" requirement, when the judgment is obtained in the absence of personal jurisdiction. The common thinking among these circuits is that a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void ab initio. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the sole outlier. In this case, it held that Rule 60(c)(1) governs the timing of a motion seeking vacatur of a void judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).

The question presented is:

Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-808_k53l.pdf

24-924 HENCELY V. FLUOR CORP.

DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 412

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1994

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Former U.S. Army Specialist Winston T. Hencely was critically and permanently injured by a suicide bomber inside Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. The bomber, Ahmad Nayeb, worked on base for a government contractor. An Army investigation found that the attack's primary contributing factor was the contractor's actions in breach of its Army contract and in violation of the military's instructions to supervise Nayeb. Hencely sued the government contractor for negligence under South Carolina law. He did not sue the military under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Even so, the Fourth Circuit held that Hencely's state claims are preempted by unspoken "federal interests" emanating from an FTCA exception. Invoking Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the court of appeals held that the FTCA's exception immunizing the government for "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces ... during time of war," 28 U.S.C. §2680(j), barred Hencely's South Carolina claims against the contractor. The decision below reaffirmed a 3-1-1 split among the Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits over Boyle's reach when contractors defend against state tort claims by invoking §2680(j).

The question presented is:

Should Boyle be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-924_c18e.pdf

24-1056 RICO V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 720900

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-2662

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-1056_4gd5.pdf

24-624 CASE V. MONTANA

DECISION BELOW: 553 P.3d 985

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: DA 23-0136

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

See transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-624_3eah.pdf

Docket Number: 24-109

Decision Below: 732 F.Supp.3d 574

Question Presented

Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin , 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin , 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals.

In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The questions presented are:

1. Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8?

2. Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny?

3. Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions?

4. Is this action non-justiciable?

CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-110. THESE CASES ARE RESTORED TO THE CALENDAR FOR REARGUMENT. IN DUE COURSE, THE COURT WILL ISSUE AN ORDER SCHEDULING ARGUMENT AND SPECIFYING ANY ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED IN SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING.

Order of August 1, 2025:

THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS ADDRESSING THE FOLLOWING QUESTION RAISED ON PAGES 36—38 OF THE BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: WHETHER THE STATE’S INTENTIONAL CREATION OF A SECOND MAJORITY-MINORITY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT VIOLATES THE FOURTEENTH OR FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U. S. CONSTITUTION.

JURISDICTION NOTED 11/4/2024

---------------------------------------

24-110 ROBINSON V. CALLAIS

DECISION BELOW: 732 F.Supp.3d 574

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 3:24-cv-00122-DCJ-CES-RRS

The questions presented are:

1. Did the District Court err in concluding that race predominated in the design of CD6 based on the Legislature's stated intent to comply with the rulings of the Robinson courts without presuming the good faith of the legislature, attempting to disentangle the Legislature's racial and political considerations, or requiring an alternative map that satisfied both §2 and the Legislature's political objectives, as required by Alexander v. S. C. State Conf. of NAACP , 144 S. Ct. 1221, 1233-1234 (2024)?

2. Did the District Court err when it disregarded the rulings of the courts in Robinson that the Gingles preconditions could be (and had been) satisfied and instead required that the State's enacted map satisfy the first Gingles precondition to survive strict scrutiny?

3. Did the District Court err in failing to accord the Louisiana Legislature sufficient breathing room to account for political considerations that resulted in a less compact district than necessary to satisfy §2?

4. Did the District Court err in relying on extra-record evidence and ignoring the evidence in the record on SB8's respect for communities of interest in concluding that SB8 failed to satisfy strict scrutiny?

5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by unnecessarily expediting the proceedings and limiting the evidence presented in this complex, fact-intensive case?

See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-109_feah.pdf

Docket Number: 24-482

Decision Bellow: 113 F.4th 839 (8th Cir. 2024)

Question Presented

Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

John F. Bash, Esquire, of Austin, Texas, is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgement below.

Cert. Granted April 7, 2025

See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-482_6j37.pdf

Docket Number: 24-5438

Decision Below: CA 11 Order 6/27/2024

Lower Court Case Number: 24-11704

Question Presented

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), "[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed." (emphasis added).

The first question presented is:

Whether 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 22 U.S.C. § 2255.

* * *

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), "[t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari." (emphasis added).

The second question presented is:

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Kasdin M. Mitchell, Esquire, of Dallas, Texas, is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below as to question 1 presented by the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Cert. Granted January 17, 2025

See Transcript

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-5438_2dp3.pdf

Docket Number: 24-351

Date Argued: October 8, 2025

Decision Below: 96 F.4th 799 (5th Cir. 2024)

Lower Court Case Number: 23-10179

Question Presented

Docket Number: 24-568

Date Argued: October 8, 2025

Decision Below: 114 F.4th 634 (7th Cir. 2024)

Lower Court Case Number: 23-2644

Question Presented

Federal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be received up to fourteen days after Election Day.

The sole question presented is whether Petitioners, as federal Candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.

Cert. Granted June 2, 2025.

See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-568_7l48.pdf

Docket Number: 24-5774

Decision Below: 102 F.4th 60 (2d Cir. 2024)

Lower Court Case Number: 21-1379

Question Presented

1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.

2. Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney , 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).

Petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to question 1 presented by the petition. Charles L. McCloud, Esquire, of Washington, D.C., is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below.

Cert. Granted March 3, 2025.

See transcript

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-5774_7648.pdf

Docket Number: 24-539

Date Argued: October 07, 2025

Decision Below: 116 F.4th 1178

Question Presented

Kaley Chiles is a licensed counselor who helps people by talking with them. A practicing Christian, Chiles believes that people flourish when they live consistently with God's design, including their biological sex. Many of her clients seek her counsel precisely because they believe that their faith and their relationship with God establishes the foundation upon which to understand their identity and desires. But Colorado bans these consensual conversations based on the viewpoints they express. Its content- and viewpoint-based Counseling Restriction prohibits counseling conversations with minors that might encourage them to change their "sexual orientation or gender, identity, including efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions," while allowing conversations that provide "[a]ccpetance, support, and understanding for ... identity exploration and development, including ... [a]ssistance to a person undergoing gender transition." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-245-202(3.5).

The Tenth Circuit upheld this ban as a regulation of Chiles's conduct, not speech. In doing so, the court deepened a circuit split between the Eleventh and Third Circuits, which do not treat counseling conversations as conduct, and the Ninth Circuit, which does.

The question presented is:

Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause.

Cert. Granted March 10, 2025.

See Transcript

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-539_7l48.pdf

Docket Number: 24-440

Decision Below: 2024 WL 5354482

Lower Court Case Number: 23-1620

Question Presented

This case presents a clear, recognized, entrenched conflict over an important question about the application of state procedural rules in federal court.

Delaware, like numerous states, requires that in certain actions the plaintiff must also file an affidavit of merit ("AOM") with the complaint. See 18 Del. C. § 6853. An AOM is an affidavit signed by an expert stating that there are reasonable grounds to believe that each defendant has committed the alleged misconduct. See id.§ 6853(a)(l).

The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits hold that AOM provisions and comparable statutes do not govern actions in federal court because they answer the same question as-and therefore conflict with-several different Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Third and Tenth circuits, in contrast, hold that they present "no conflict" with any Federal Rules.

In the decision below, the Third Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, for at least the fifth time, refused to hold that an AOM statute conflicts with any Federal Rules. Judge Phipps "concur[red] in only the judgment." Third Circuit precedent required him to vote to affirm, he explained, but ''writing on a clean slate ... he may not [have] arrive[d] at that same conclusion."

The question presented is:

Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.

Cert. Granted March 10, 2025

See Transcript (https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-440_q86b.pdf)

Docket Number: 24-557

Date Argued: October 6, 2025

Decision Below: 707 S.W.3d 138

Lower Court Case Number: Pd-0048-20

Question Presented

Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.

Cert. Granted April 7, 2025

See transcript (https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-557_6j7a.pdf)

24A884 TRUMP V. CASA, INC.

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 654902

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:

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24A885 TRUMP V. WASHINGTON

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 553485

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:

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24A886 TRUMP V. NEW JERSEY

DECISION BELOW: 131 F.4th 27

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:

--

QUESTION PRESENTED:

THE APPLICATIONS (24A884, 24A885, AND 24A886) FOR PARTIAL STAYS ARE CONSOLIDATED AND DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT. THE APPLICATIONS ARE SET FOR A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT AT 10 A.M. ON THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2025.

SET FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 4/17/2025

You can read the oral argument transcript here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24a884_2c83.pdf