The respondent was accused of beating a person to death with an axe. Prior to his death, the deceased socialized with the respondent and a number of other persons. At some point, many people left to another venue but the respondent and the deceased remained. The deceased made a phone call to a third party in which he referred to having to fight someone. That person testified to the time of the phone call and the words used by the deceased; she also testified to hearing sounds consistent with the deceased having been beaten to death.The respondent was convicted of second-degree murder following a trial by judge alone. The trial judge referred to the statement of the deceased by phone in her decision. A majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge improperly used the statement for a hearsay purpose rather than only the fact that the statement was made. The majority allowed the appeal from conviction and ordered a new trial. Crighton J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that the trial judge did not err in her treatment of the statement of the deceased. Argued Date 2025-11-12 Keywords Criminal Law — Evidence — Hearsay — Statement of deceased shortly before death — Use of statement of the deceased by trial judge — Whether statement by deceased was used for a hearsay purpose — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in holding that trial judge improperly admitted statement for truth of its content —Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in setting aside conviction for murder Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Jacques-Taylor and a co-accused were jointly charged with firearms offences. On July 6, 2022, each co-accused’s defence counsel, Crown counsel, and a trial coordinator appeared in court to set a trial date. Mr. Jacques-Taylor’s counsel was available for the first available court date of August 8, 2022 or for any date in August but was not available in September. Crown counsel was available for the first available court date of August 8, 2022. Counsel for Mr. Jacques-Taylor’s co-accused was not available for any date in August. Counsel agreed on trial dates from October 2 to 4, 2022. Time from laying of charges to the anticipated start of trial was 22 months and 2 weeks. Mr. Jacques-Taylor filed a motion to stay the proceedings against him for unreasonable delay in breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time guaranteed by s. 11 (b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The motions judge, after attributing delay, calculated net delay to be 2 weeks over the 18-month presumptive ceiling. The motions judge declined to attribute 25 days of the delay following the appearance to schedule trial dates that were caused only by the unavailability of counsel for the co-accused as defence delay. Had those 25 days been attributed to the defence, the net delay would have been below the presumptive ceiling. The motions judge granted a stay of proceedings. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-07 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Co-accused being tried jointly — Delay for accused, including period of delay caused only by unavailability of co-accused’s counsel for available court dates, exceeding presumptive Jordan ceiling — Where it is in the interests of justice to pursue a joint prosecution, how is the Jordan framework to be applied as to each accused — What is the scope and proper application of the contextual approach to delay set out in R. v. Hanan, 2023 SCC 12? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On the advice of the Prime Minister of Canada, the Privy Council Office recommended that the Governor General issue an Order in Council appointing a Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick who was not bilingual. At trial, that appointment was found inconsistent with the bilingualism requirements in ss. 16(2), 16.1(2) and 20(2) of the Charter. The Court of Appeal set aside that decision on the basis that the appointment of a Lieutenant Governor who was not bilingual did not infringe ss. 16(2), 16.1(1), 18(2) and 20(2) of the Charter. Argued Date 2025-11-13 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Language rights — Role of Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick — Language requirement for Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick — Whether Order in Council 2019 1325 dated September 4, 2019, infringes ss. 16(2), 16.1, 18(2) and 20(2) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and, if so, what would be appropriate remedy. Notes (New Brunswick) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (the “Act”) creates a committee of Parliamentarians (the “Committee”) appointed by the Governor-in-Council who are given the authority to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence. The Committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing reports for the Prime Minister on the matters it inquires into.Where a proceeding is brought against a Committee member, based on the alleged improper disclosure of information obtained as a consequence of membership on the Committee, s. 12 of the Act expressly excludes any claim for parliamentary immunity. Statements made in Parliament or in a committee of Parliament can be the subject of a charge under the Act, or related statutory provisions, and statements made by Committee members in Parliament or in committee are admissible against the member to prove the alleged improper disclosure.Appellant Ryan Alford, a law professor, sought and was granted public interest standing to bring a challenge to the constitutionality of s. 12. He brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12 was ultra vires Parliament. A judge of Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice granted the application and declared s. 12 ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and constitutionally invalid. The Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously allowed Canada’s appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-06 Keywords Constitutional law — Canadian institutions — Parliament — Parliamentary privilege — National security — Parliament enacting legislation authorizing committee of parliamentarians to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence — Legislation prohibiting committee members from disclosing protected information and eliminating immunity claims based on parliamentary privilege in proceedings arising from disclosure — Whether s. 12 of National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act ultra vires Parliament’s power to enact legislation defining parliamentary privileges – Whether s. 12 abrogating privilege that is part of Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that amendments to Constitution can only be made in accordance with Constitution’s own exclusive and explicit provisions for amendment — National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15, s. 12 — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 18 — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (the “Act”) creates a committee of Parliamentarians (the “Committee”) appointed by the Governor-in-Council who are given the authority to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence. The Committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing reports for the Prime Minister on the matters it inquires into.Where a proceeding is brought against a Committee member, based on the alleged improper disclosure of information obtained as a consequence of membership on the Committee, s. 12 of the Act expressly excludes any claim for parliamentary immunity. Statements made in Parliament or in a committee of Parliament can be the subject of a charge under the Act, or related statutory provisions, and statements made by Committee members in Parliament or in committee are admissible against the member to prove the alleged improper disclosure.Appellant Ryan Alford, a law professor, sought and was granted public interest standing to bring a challenge to the constitutionality of s. 12. He brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12 was ultra vires Parliament. A judge of Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice granted the application and declared s. 12 ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and constitutionally invalid. The Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously allowed Canada’s appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-05 Keywords Constitutional law — Canadian institutions — Parliament — Parliamentary privilege — National security — Parliament enacting legislation authorizing committee of parliamentarians to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence — Legislation prohibiting committee members from disclosing protected information and eliminating immunity claims based on parliamentary privilege in proceedings arising from disclosure — Whether s. 12 of National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act ultra vires Parliament’s power to enact legislation defining parliamentary privileges – Whether s. 12 abrogating privilege that is part of Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that amendments to Constitution can only be made in accordance with Constitution’s own exclusive and explicit provisions for amendment — National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15, s. 12 — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 18 — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents are owners of lots that border three lakes in Ville d’Estérel. Following the renewal of the cadastre of Ville d’Estérel in 2016, the respondents discovered that they were not owners of a submerged strip of land that goes around each of the lakes and is situated in front of their respective lots. The appellant claimed to own that strip of land, immatriculated separately in the cadastre as several lots, whereas the respondents stated that they own it. Through an application for a declaratory judgment, the respondents sought a declaration confirming that they are respectively owners of the submerged lots adjacent to the lands they own. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed their application, finding that the submerged lots are the property of the appellant. The Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the respondents’ appeal in part. It found that the submerged strip of land is accessory to the riparian lots pursuant to the doctrine of accessory. Argued Date 2025-11-10 Keywords Property — Immovables — Submerged lots — Extent of right of ownership near watercourses and lakes — Doctrine of accessory — Whether doctrine of accessory is applicable to lots submerged as result of construction of dam — If so, whether doctrine should apply only in residual manner, if doubt persists as to common intention of parties — Whether Court of Appeal erred in interfering, without identifying palpable and overriding error, with findings at trial concerning interpretion of words [TRANSLATION] “bounded by the lake” and common intention of parties. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)Canadian Patent No. 2,655,335 (“’335 Patent”), which was issued to Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. for INVEGA SUSTENNA, involves a suspension of paliperidone palmitate for the treatment of schizophrenia and related disorders. The ’335 Patent teaches a dosing regimen to achieve an optimum plasma concentration-time profile. Its claims have been construed in previous litigation and are not in issue: Janssen Inc. v. Teva Canada Ltd., 2020 FC 593,; Janssen Inc. v. Pharmascience Inc., 2022 FC 62, aff’d 2024 FCA 10 (“PMS Paliperidone”)). Its disclosure indicated that “[t]hose of ordinary skill in the art will understand that the maintenance dose may be [adjusted] up or down in view of patients condition (response to the medication and renal function)”.Pharmascience Inc. has served two Notices of Allegation in respect of pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE, its proposed generic version of INVEGA SUSTENNA. In 2020, Janssen’s infringement action related to Pharmascience’s Abbreviated New Drug Submission No. 236094 was discontinued on consent. Shortly thereafter, Pharmascience served a Notice of Allegation and Detailed Statement in respect of a different Abbreviated New Drug Submission — No. 244641 — seeking approval to market and sell doses of pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE. Janssen again commenced an infringement action under s. 6(1) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133. In that proceeding, Pharmascience moved for summary trial. It was found that if Pharmascience’s pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE was made, constructed, used or sold as set out in the Abbreviated New Drug Submission, it would influence prescribers to prescribe the dosing regimen claimed in the ’335 Patent, leading to direct infringement: PMS Paliperidone. The defence of invalidity went forward, with Janssen seeking a declaration that Pharmascience would infringe the ’335 Patent if it were to make, use or sell pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE in 50, 75, 100 and 150 mg doses.The Federal Court found that the Patent was not invalid based on obviousness or for lack of patentable subject matter. The claims provided specified dosing regimens meant to produce a concentration of the medication within the therapeutic range. If a physician chose to use a dose other than that claimed, to stop treatment or to change therapies, they would no longer be practicing the claimed invention. The Court of Appeal dismissed Pharmascience’s appeal, finding that the use of the invention did not require the exercise of skill and judgment. Argued Date 2025-10-09 Keywords Intellectual property — Patents — Validity — Lack of patentable subject matter — Method of medical treatment — Vendible product — Skill and judgment — Fixed or variable dosing regimen — Canadian Patent No. 2,655,335 teaches dosing regimen that includes first loading dose, second loading dose and monthly maintenance doses — Regimen incorporates dosing windows of +/- 2 days for the second loading dose and +/- 7 days for the maintenance doses — Whether patent is invalid in that it claims an unpatentable method of medical treatment. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant’s spouse went missing in 2008. In 2017, the appellant obtained a declaratory judgment of her spouse’s death pursuant to art. 92 of the Civil Code of Québec in a proceeding contested by the spouse’s life insurance company. After the spouse was declared deceased, the life insurance company applied to annul the declaration of death on the basis that there was evidence he was alive in another country as late as 2018. The application was not served on the party declared to have died.The Superior Court of Quebec judge granted the life insurance company’s application and annulled the declaration of death. She concluded that there was no prejudice flowing from the fact that the application was not served on the declared decedent. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal only with respect to application judge’s costs award but otherwise affirmed the Superior Court judge’s decision. Argued Date 2025-10-10 Keywords Status of persons — Absence — Return — Declaratory judgment of death — Life insurance company seeking to annul declaratory judgment of death — What proof of return is required to annul a declaratory judgment of death — Whether an application by a third party to annul a declaratory judgment of death must be served on the person declared to be deceased — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 92, 97, 98. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

During the course of an investigation under the Traffic Safety Act, a police officer attempted to effect a warrantless arrest of the applicant for obstruction under s. 129(a) of the Criminal Code. In a pre-trial application, the trial judge found that the police officer was not executing a lawful arrest, and therefore breached the applicant’s s. 9 Charter right not to be arbitrarily detained by attempting the arrest. The trial judge acquitted the applicant of assault causing bodily harm. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-10-17 Keywords Criminal law — Arrest — Can a police officer arrest an individual for obstruction under the Criminal Code, during the course of a regulatory (or municipal) investigation where the regulatory (or municipal) statute provides for a lesser enforcement remedy — Does the discretion referenced in Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 46 allow police officers to engage the more serious Criminal Code provisions during the course of an investigation for less serious regulatory or municipal offences? Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

A police investigation into the production of marijuana led to criminal proceedings against 11 individuals. A stay of proceedings was entered for the respondents in light of unreasonable delays. The Court of Québec dismissed the motion to dismiss the motion for forfeiture pursuant to ss. 491.1 and 462.37(2) of the Cr. C. and s. 16(2) of the CDSA. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed the motion for prohibition and certiorari in aid. The Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the Superior Court judge’s decision and stated that the Court of Québec did not have the jurisdiction required to deal with motions for forfeiture pursuant to ss. 491.1 and 462.37(2) of the Cr. C. and s. 16(2) of the CDSA. Argued Date 2025-10-16 Keywords Criminal law — Proceeds of crime — Offence related property — Restraint order — Jurisdiction of provincial court — Appropriate procedural vehicles — Whether property included in application for forfeiture pursuant to s. 462.37(2) of Criminal Code and s. 16(2) of Controlled Drugs and Substances Act must be related to offence for which there was conviction — Whether stay of proceedings prevents prosecutor from proving facts forming basis for charges in context of motion for forfeiture of offence related property or of proceeds of crime — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 462.37(2) — Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 16(2). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Anglin was a member of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta from 2012 until 2015, when he was unsuccessful in his re-election bid. He accepts the result of the election, but alleges that the Chief Electoral Officer interfered with the fairness of the election and, by doing so, injured his chances of being elected. He seeks damages for the alleged loss of the chance to be elected. During the election, the Chief Electoral Officer, Mr. Resler, investigated problems with Mr. Anglin’s election signs and his handling of the list of electors. After the election, the Chief Electoral Officer assessed two administrative penalties against Mr. Anglin, who appealed both penalties. One penalty was overturned due to the Chief Electoral Officer’s failure to provide Mr. Anglin with the investigation report, but the basis for assessing the fine was not found to be problematic. Mr. Anglin then commenced this action against the Chief Electoral Officer and others alleging that the Chief Electoral Officer should not have commenced the investigations and that he should have known that his actions would injure Mr. Anglin. The Chief Electoral Officer denied the factual allegations and invoked ss. 5.1 of the Election Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-1, which provides a general immunity when the Chief Electoral Officer acts in good faith, and s. 134(5), which authorizes the Chief Electoral Officer to remove non-compliant signs. Later, he applied to strike the claim for failure to disclose a cause of action or for abuse of process, with an alternative request for summary judgment due to lack of merit.Finding that the claim was a collateral attack on the validity of the election, the chambers judge struck the entire statement of claim for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action or as an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstated the claim other than the allegations of malicious prosecution, and remitted the Chief Electoral Officer’s claim for summary judgment application to trial court. Argued Date 2025-10-14 Keywords Elections — Jurisdiction — Chief Electoral Officer — Chief Electoral Officer required candidate to remedy inappropriate elements of signs — Candidate losing election — Candidate sued Chief Electoral Officer for damages for loss of chance to win election — Candidate did not challenge result of election — Chief Electoral Officer moved to strike claim for failure to disclose a cause of action, abuse of process or lack of merit — Whether an unsuccessful candidate for election can bring a private action against an election officer for the loss of chance of being elected. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

11368 NL Inc. was the owner of commercial real estate known as Kenmount Terrace. Patrick Street Holdings Limited is part of a group of related companies that, through loans secured by mortgages, financed development projects undertaken by a group of related companies including 11368 NL Inc. In early 2016, two mortgages known as Mortgage 608132 and Mortgage 708519 went into default and notices of power of sale were issued under the Conveyancing Act, RSNL 1990, c. C-34. These power of sale proceedings halted when 11368 NL Inc., as the mortgagee, gave a third mortgage known as Mortgage 759678. Mortgage 759678 is a collateral mortgage registered against Kenmount Terrace to a limit of $4,000,000 in support of 11368 NL Inc.’s guarantee of Mortgage 608132. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. reactivated power of sale proceedings under Mortgage 708519 and obtained Kenmount Terrace at public auction. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. provided an accounting of the proceeds of the power of sale to all encumbrancers of Kenmount Terrace stating that specific charges including Mortgage 759678 took priority and exhausted the power of sale proceeds such that not all encumbrancers could be paid. Two unpaid encumbrancers commenced an application challenging the accounting. 11368 NL Inc. filed an interlocutory application claiming entitlement to any surplus funds from the power of sale plus interest, but also advancing a claim of priority for another encumbrancer, Ms. Cheeke. On October 3, 2017, Handrigan J. determined the two encumbrancers’ application but not 11368’s interlocutory application. Handrigan J. held there was a surplus on the power of sale of approximately $4.2 million. He accepted most of Patrick Street Holdings Ltd.’s accounting but did not include its claim to $4,000,000 under Mortgage 759678 in his accounting. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. appealed, The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. paid the two applicant encumbrancers’ claims and withheld the balance of the surplus of the power of sale proceeds. On July 16, 2022, Handrigan J. determined the interlocutory application filed by 11368 NL Inc. Handrigan J. held Ms. Cheeke’s encumbrance took priority and was due from the remaining surplus. He held that his conclusion on October 3, 2017, that Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. had not established what was owing under Mortgage 759678 had been accepted on appeal and nothing had been shown to cause him to change his mind on this issue. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. was ordered to pay the surplus remaining after payment to Ms. Cheeke to 11368 NL Inc. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. appealed. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-10-15 Keywords Civil procedure — Res judicata — Estoppel — Abuse of process by re-litigation — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in finding res judicata may be raised for first time on appeal — If so, whether requirements of res judicata satisfied — Whether doctrine of abuse of process by re-litigation applied beyond permissible limits — Whether abuse of process for purchaser to rely on collateral mortgage — Amount due and payable under a mortgage at the time of power of sale proceedings. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2015, a finding of misconduct was made against an Edmonton Police Service (EPS) detective, and was recorded in a document entitled “Decision of Hearing”. The EPS provided the respondent, His Majesty the King in Right of Canada (hereafter, the “Crown”), with a copy of the Decision of Hearing in July 2015 in relation to a prosecution. The finding of misconduct to which the Decision of Hearing relates was later removed from the detective’s record of discipline by operation of s. 22 of the Police Service Regulation.By June of 2022, respondent John McKee had been charged with drug and weapons offences, following an investigation in which the detective had been involved. In July 2023, the Crown advised Mr. McKee’s counsel that records relating to the detective’s past misconduct may be relevant and subject to disclosure, as the details of the misconduct were serious and had a realistic bearing on the detective’s credibility. The Crown further advised that the EPS opposed disclosure of the records but the Crown would consent to an application for disclosure if Mr. McKee should choose to bring one.Mr. McKee brought an application for disclosure in the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta. The application judge held that the information of misconduct in the Decision of Hearing was relevant and disclosable by the Crown as first-party information. The application was granted. Argued Date 2025-10-08 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Disclosure — Police disciplinary records — Information relating to past finding of misconduct of police detective removed from detective’s record of discipline pursuant to Police Service Regulation — Detective involved in investigation leading to charges against accused — Crown determining information concerning detective’s past misconduct possibly relevant and material to accused’s prosecution — Detective and chief of police opposing disclosure — Application judge determining information of misconduct must be disclosed — Whether the scope of “the possession of the prosecuting Crown” includes information provided to the Crown’s office outside of the particular prosecution at issue — Scope of disclosure of police disciplinary records required by R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3 — Whether statutorily expunged findings of police officer misconduct disclosable to the accused in unrelated criminal proceedings — Whether factors not listed in R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 constitute permissible exemptions to horizontal stare decisis — Police Service Regulation, Alta. Reg. 356/1990, s. 22. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2015, a finding of misconduct was made against an Edmonton Police Service (EPS) detective, and was recorded in a document entitled “Decision of Hearing”. The EPS provided the respondent, His Majesty the King in Right of Canada (hereafter, the “Crown”), with a copy of the Decision of Hearing in July 2015 in relation to a prosecution. The finding of misconduct to which the Decision of Hearing relates was later removed from the detective’s record of discipline by operation of s. 22 of the Police Service Regulation.By June of 2022, respondent John McKee had been charged with drug and weapons offences, following an investigation in which the detective had been involved. In July 2023, the Crown advised Mr. McKee’s counsel that records relating to the detective’s past misconduct may be relevant and subject to disclosure, as the details of the misconduct were serious and had a realistic bearing on the detective’s credibility. The Crown further advised that the EPS opposed disclosure of the records but the Crown would consent to an application for disclosure if Mr. McKee should choose to bring one.Mr. McKee brought an application for disclosure in the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta. The application judge held that the information of misconduct in the Decision of Hearing was relevant and disclosable by the Crown as first-party information. The application was granted. Argued Date 2025-10-07 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Disclosure — Police disciplinary records — Information relating to past finding of misconduct of police detective removed from detective’s record of discipline pursuant to Police Service Regulation — Detective involved in investigation leading to charges against accused — Crown determining information concerning detective’s past misconduct possibly relevant and material to accused’s prosecution — Detective and chief of police opposing disclosure — Application judge determining information of misconduct must be disclosed — Whether the scope of “the possession of the prosecuting Crown” includes information provided to the Crown’s office outside of the particular prosecution at issue — Scope of disclosure of police disciplinary records required by R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3 — Whether statutorily expunged findings of police officer misconduct disclosable to the accused in unrelated criminal proceedings — Whether factors not listed in R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 constitute permissible exemptions to horizontal stare decisis — Police Service Regulation, Alta. Reg. 356/1990, s. 22. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

B.F., a surgical nurse, has a child, E. B.F. and E.’s father are separated and, in 2019, were engaged in litigation about parenting rights. An interim ruling in that case in early June 2019 granted E.’s father supervised access, which B.F. resisted. At this time, B.F. was residing with her mother, I.F.On June 12, 2019, after the interim ruling, a neighbour found B.F., I.F., and E., then 19 months old, in B.F.’s home. All three were unconscious in B.F.’s bedroom; E. was in her crib. First responders found five empty insulin pens at the scene, each of which originally contained many times the normal adult dose. There were nine visible injection marks on E.’s body and evidence that E. had resisted the injections; no injection marks were visible on B.F. or I.F. The first responders also located a handwritten letter at the scene that they characterized as a suicide note. Due to the quantity of insulin injected into her system, E. suffered serious and permanent brain damage, as well as permanent damage to other organs. She was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and spasticity, and suffers from seizures. She requires constant medical care. B.F. and I.F. have since fully recovered. B.F. was arrested and charged with two counts of attempted murder by administering a noxious substance (a potentially lethal amount of insulin by injection), and two counts of aggravated assault.The jury convicted B.F. of the attempted murder of E. and I.F., and of the aggravated assault of E. The jury acquitted B.F. of the aggravated assault of I.F.B.F. appealed her conviction and sentence. The conviction appeal in relation to the attempted murder of E. was dismissed. The conviction appeal in relation to the attempted murder of I.F. was allowed and a new trial ordered. Argued Date 2025-05-22 Keywords Criminal law — Offences — Elements of offence — Charge to jury — Party liability — Attempted murder and aiding suicide — Suicide pact defence — Whether victim of a crime may also be a principal of an offence — Whether accused may be liable as a party to an offence without a principal offender being found guilty — Whether trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the scenario presented by counsel for B.F. — Whether jury instructions were misleading to the point of error — Whether jury instructions raise a reasonable apprehension of biais — Whether suicide pact defence available — Whether Court of Appeal erred in approach to causation — Whether Court of Appeal incorrectly required additional elements that must be satisfied for an act that may assist suicide to also constitute murder Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent was arrested without warrant by the police 11 days after the date of an alleged crime. At his trial, he brought a motion in which he claimed that his arrest and his detention following his arrest were unlawful pursuant to s. 495(2)(b), (d) and (e) of the Criminal Code and s. 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He argued that the power to arrest and detain without warrant for a hybrid offence is lawful only if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was actually committed or is about to be committed and that such measures are necessary in the public interest.The trial judge summarily dismissed the motion on the ground that it had no chance of success. The police officers could, pursuant to s. 495(3) of the Criminal Code, proceed solely on reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was actually committed. There was nothing unlawful about his arrest. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had erred in refusing to hold a voir dire on the motion, because the motion was not bound to fail. The right to challenge the lawfulness of the arrest without warrant is guaranteed by the terms of s. 495(3) in accordance with a viable interpretation of the limitations imposed on the power of arrest without warrant set out in s. 495(2). The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-05-21 Keywords Criminal law — Arrest — Police — Powers — Arrest without warrant — Whether s. 495(2) of Criminal Code modifies peace officer’s power to arrest person without warrant — Whether s. 495(3) of Criminal Code excuses non compliance with s. 495(2) — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that trial judge had erred in summarily dismissing motion in which unlawfulness of arrest by reason of non compliance with s. 495(2) was alleged — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 495. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On December 6, 2021, S.A. was charged with assault and sexual assault. He elected to be tried by judge and jury. A trial date of April 17, 2023 was set but, on April 17, 2023, the trial could not commence because no judge was available. A trial date was set for February 12, 2024. Forestell J. held that delay of 6 to 10 months was unreasonable and breached s. 11(b) of the Charter. Notwithstanding that net delay was below the presumptive ceiling of 30 months set in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, she stayed the proceedings. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2025-05-16 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to tried in reasonable time — How should delay caused by judicial vacancy be treated under s. 11(b) of the Charter? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2019, Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah both applied for transfer to a minimum security institution. At the time, Mr. Dorsey, a dangerous offender, was incarcerated at a medium security facility; Mr. Salah was sentenced to concurrent life sentences and is incarcerated at a different medium security facility. Mr. Dorsey’s case management team, his Manager of Assessment and Intervention, and his Warden all agreed that he met the criteria for reclassification to minimum security but, because of his dangerous offender status, his transfer request had to be approved by the Regional Deputy Commissioner and then the Assistant Commissioner of Correctional Operations and Programs. In September 2019, the Regional Deputy Commissioner assessed Mr. Dorsey’s public safety rating as moderate. His request was denied.Mr. Salah’s case management team, his parole officer, and his Manager of Assessment and Intervention recommended reclassification and transfer to a minimum security facility, but, in October 2019, a new Manager of Assessment and Intervention and Intervention was assigned to his file. He assessed Mr. Salah as a moderate escape risk, so the Warden wrongly denied his transfer request.Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah each applied under the Habeas Corpus Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-1, for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with certiorari in aid. Although they did not apply under the Charter, they alleged that the denial of their transfer requests engaged ss. 7, 9, 10(c) and 12 of the Charter. On consent, the applications were joined for the purpose of determining a common threshold legal issue: whether Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah could resort to habeas corpus to challenge the denials of their applications for transfer to lower security prisons.The applications were dismissed on the grounds that habeas corpus was not available for denials of reclassification, which were not deprivations of residual liberty. After the application judge’s decision, Mr. Dorsey was reclassified and transferred to a minimum security institution, but he continued his appeal. The appeal was dismissed. Argued Date 2025-05-13 Keywords Prerogative writs — Habeas corpus — Prisons — Deprivation of residual liberty — Security classification — Transfer — Denial of reclassification — Denial of transfer to lower security institution — Whether denial of reclassification and transfer to lower security institution is deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by way of habeas corpus. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent is a criminal defence lawyer whose client was the subject of a wiretap authorization under the Criminal Code. The authorization did not permit live monitoring of phone calls with a lawyer; such calls could be recorded, but a judge’s order was required to access them. During the surveillance operation, the respondent called her client, which was automatically recorded. A civilian employee also listened to a portion of the call before disconnecting.A reviewing judge concluded that an initial portion of the telephone call was not subject to solicitor-client privilege and it was released to the Crown. The recording revealed the respondent informed her client that a third party had been arrested and that the police would likely be obtaining search warrants for places where the third party had been. The respondent was charged with wilfully attempting to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice by interfering in an ongoing police investigation, contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.In a voir dire, the trial judge concluded that the respondent’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter were not breached with respect to the civilian employee listening to her phone conversation. However, she also concluded that her rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter had been breached due to her inability to access the second, privileged portion of the recording. She ordered the entire recording excluded under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Crown called no evidence and the respondent was acquitted.A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the acquittal and the trial judge’s decision with respect to the breaches of the respondent’s rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. However, it also concluded that her rights under s. 8 had been breached, and it therefore would have excluded the evidence of the telephone call under s. 24(2) of the Charter rather than s. 24(1). The dissenting judge would have held that the respondent’s ss. 7 and 11(d) rights were not breached. He agreed with the majority that there was a breach of her s. 8 rights, but he would have held that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2). He would have ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-05-20 Keywords Criminal Law — Charter of rights — Search and seizure (s. 8) — Full answer and defence (ss. 7 and 11(d) — Solicitor-client privilege — Wire-tap authorization — Interaction between solicitor-client privilege and an accused’s lawyer’s Charter rights — Wire-tap monitoring and recording of phone call between defence counsel and client — Whether the respondent’s right to make full answer and defence was breached by not having access to the full recording of a phone call protected by solicitor-client privilege — Whether evidence obtained by s. 8 breaches should have been excluded. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-15 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).